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Abstract: lieceut developments in noncooperative game theory (especially those
dealing with information transmission and equilibrium refinements) are illustrated by
means oí variations on a simple market entry game.z
1 Introduction
During the last decade there has been a tremendous increase in the use of game theoretic
modeling and methodology in the social sciences, especially in economics, accompanied
by a considerable progress in the development uf the theory itself. My aim in this paper
is t.u illustrate some of Lhese recent developments and to show why they were necessary
for the applications to be successíul. Emphasis will be on the intuitive ideas, not on thc
forn~al conccpts. l~or a description of the latter, the re.ader may turn Lo VAN DAMMI;
(1987).
'I'he two areas in economics that have probably profited most from adopting game
theoretic models are `industrial organization' and `the economics of information'. In
the present paper we consider variations on a simple market entry game. This example
is choseri to allow illustration of some of the basic issues in these areas, as well as of
the game theoretic problems involved. In Section 2, the most simple variant of this
game is considered (Fig. 1). The game of Fig. 1 is one of perfect information and
illustrates the difference between Nash equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria. In
Section 3 modifications of the game are introduced that have incomplete inÍormation.
The examples in this section illustrate the notion of sequential equilibrium, as well as
why it is necessary to refine this concept. Various such refinements are briefly discussed.
The games considered in Section 3 are so called signaling games. They have the fol-
lowing structure: There are two players, one informed and one uninformed; the informed
party moves first and its action is observed by the uniuformed; the uninformed draws
inferences about which information the other has and then takes an action; the payoffs to
both players depend on the actions taken and on the information. The essential question
is how much information will be revealed in equilibrium. Typically, however, there ex-
ist multiple equilibria, both pooling ones (no information transfer) as well as separating
ones (full information revelation) and hybrids (part of the information is revealed). More
refined equilibrium notions try to capture the idea, called Forward Induction, that the
uninformed party should realize that the other will reveal only that information that is
profitable to him. Section 3 makes this idea more precise.3
It should be clear that examples of signaling games abound. Let us just mention a few:
(i) Finance (buying back shares signals that they are undervalued), (ii) Macrceconomics
(Mrs 'I'. waul.s to sigual Lhat shr is rcally tough on inflation), (iii) lntclligcucc (how
to show that you are not a double spy?), (iv) Accounting (You know you cheated bul.
the tax inspector does not), (v) Advertising (a more extended warranty signals higher
quality), (vi) Bargaining (how to show your strength?) and (vii) Politics (how can Mr
Krenz show that he is "differentr from Mr Honecker?, Is the opening of the Berlin Wall
together with displaying the luxuries of Wandlitz enough to establish credibility? Hence,
the question of how to solve these games is of some importance. (It is worthwhile to
note that signaling games were first studied in SPENCE (1973).)
In Section 4 we turn to the case where the private information that a player has is
not exogenously determined, but rather concerns what he will do in the future. It is
shown that the idea oí Forward Induction may increase the predictive power of game
theory also in this case. Section 5 considers an even more elaborate model in which
there is simultaneous signaling of private information about the past (i.e. the type) and
the future (i.e. the actions). The model of that Section, although relatively simple, is a
prototype of the so called `reputation' models in macro-economics, i.e. how, in repeated
context, one can get a reputation for being tough (or for being cooperative). Again
I'orward Induction is an cssential element when trying to interpret signals.
'I'hc~ paper ~rnphasizes the underlying idras rather than the formalities. The discussiou
will make clear that marry important problems in the area are still open, and some open
problems are mentioned in the text. It is hoped that the material signals that this is a
very challenging area to work in.
2 Market Entry: Complete Information
Consider a market in which 2 firms (firm I and firm II) contemplate entry. The market,
however, is a natural monopoly. If one firm enters, it makes a profit (say of I unit), but
if both firms enter, each makes a loss (say of a units each). If a firm stays out, it has
zero profit. Let us first assume that firm I has detected the potential profitability of this4
market first. IIence, firm I makes its entry decision first and is committed to this choice.
Firm II decides upon entry after firm I and being fully informed about firm I's choice.
The situation may be modeled by the extensive form game from Figure 1.
Figure 1
I
The solution of the game is found by straightíorward backward induction (dynamic
programming): Firm II will choose OUT wlren I has chosen IN (having 0 is better than
losing n) and Il will choose 1N whcn I has chosen OU1'. Knowing this it is optimal for
player I to choose IN. 'I'he outcome is that firm I captures Lhe market and that lI stays
out.
Using garne theoretic terminology, one says that the above solution is the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game (SLL1'PN (1965)). 'Phis solution is also a Nash equi-
librium but there exist other Nash equilibria as well. A second Nash equilibrium is the
strategy pair where firm I chooses OUT and II decides to go IN irrespective of what I
has done. The reason that this pair is a Nash equilibrium is that II's threat (to play IN
after I has chosen IN) dces not have to be executed when it is believed by I. Basically
tlre Nash concept only requires that players behave optimally on the equilibrium path;
since only ex ante expected payoffs matter for this concept, events off the equilibrium
path arc irrelevant as they have probability zero. However, in games, probabilities are
endogenously cietermined, hence, an event to which one assigns zero probability ex ante
dces mattcr since during the game one may find out that it has happened after all. In the
game o[ Figure 1, even if II expects I to choose OU'I', he may observe I choosing IN and
in that case I I optirnally chooses OU'T: 'I'he threat to play IN in that event is incredible.
Selten's concept of subgame perfectness strengthens Nash's notion in that it reyuires ex5
post optimality at every decision point rather than ex ante optimality. By now there is
almost unanimous agreement among game theorists that those Nash equilibria that are
not subgame perfect do not make sense.
Even though for games of perfect information the notion of ex post optimality is easy
to define (one simply assumes that no matter what has happened in the past, players
will behave rationally in the future', hence one obtains the standard dynamic program-
ming procedure), things become much more intricate when information is imperfect or
incomplete. The KREPS AND WILSON (1982) notion of sequential equilibrium (which
is closely related to SELTEN's (1975) perfectness concept) can be seen as an attempt to
extend the dynamic programming reasoning to this class of games. The basic idea is that
at each decision point a player constructs beliefs about what has happened in the past
and then optimizes against these beliefs. One naturally requires that beliefs are Bayes
consistent with the strategies that are played and that they are consistent across time
and across players. The examples from Section 3 illustrate the sequential equilibrium
concept as well as the need to refine it.
3 Market Entry: Incomplete Information
Consider the market entry situation discussed in the previous section but now assume
that if both firms enter the outcome is determined by a battle, the winner of which is
the financially strongest firm. There are two possibilities: Firm I is either strong (in
which case it wins the battle) or weak (and then it looses). Assume that the loosing
firm looses a, that firm II makes an overall profit of b if it drives the weak firm I out of
the market and that firm I looses z(which may be positive or negative) when it wins
the battle from firm II. Assume that firm I knows which case prevails but that II only
knows that I is strong with probability 1- e and weak with probability e. (e small but
positive.) Assume also that these beliefs are common knowledge. Again firm I moves
first and firm I's choice is observable. Note that the essential assumption is that the
market may be profitable for II even as a duopoly, but that there is only a very amall
'BINMORF, (1987) and others have pointed out the logical difticulties of this procedure.6
probability that this is the case. The game now has one-sided incomplete information;
it may be represented by a tree in which first nature determines which firm is superior,
then firm I(having this information) moves and finally firm II (knowing only what I has
done) chooses between IN and OUT. Note that firm I's action may signal its information.
Such a game is therefore called a signaling game. A bimatrix representation of the game
is given in Figure 2. (The left matrix describes the payoffs if I is superior (- strong),




















The game is easy to solve if x is negative. In this case it is a dominant atrategy for
the strong firm I to enter. Firm II knows this and assesses a probability of at least 1- E
that it will loose a if it enters as well. Hence, if e is small, firm II will choose to stay OUT
after [ has gone IN. The weak firm I, knowing this, also chooses IN. Hence, the presence
of the strong firm I provides a positive externality for the weak type of this firm. In the
incomplete information game, the weak type has payoff one whereas its payoff would be
zero if it were common knowledge that it were weak.
Things become more interesting if x~ 0. Intuitively one would argue that, if E
is small, the solution should not be much different from the one where it is common
knowledge that firm I is strong (E - 0). The latter was derived in the previous section:
The stroug firm I chooses IN and after this choice Il decides to remain OUT (which again
enables to wcak firm I to also ente.r). Indecd if E C a~(a -1- 6) there ezists a seyuential
equilibrium in which firm I chooses IN irrespective of its type and II chooses OUT after
IN. (Such an equilibrium in which the action of the informed party dces not reveal any
information about its type is said to be a pooling equilibrium.) However, paradoxical
as it may seem, there exists a second pooling equilibrium and in this equilibrium, throutcome is completely different from the outcome derived in the previous section. In the
second equilibrium, firm [ chooses OUT irrespective of its type and firm II chooses IN
irrespective of what I dces, hence, II captures the market. Note that given this strategy
of II, the behavior of I is indeed optimal (by going IN I always looses so it is better
to stay OUT), and it is clearly also optimal for II to go [N when I stayed OUT. The
questiou is whether 11's threat to go IN also when I goes IN is credible. (Note that, in thc
equilibrium the threat does not have to be carried out, I never chooses IN.) According
to the sequential equilibrium concept, this threat is credible: If II observes that I has
chosen IN, II may believe that. firm I is of the weak type (belie[s are arbitrary since
Bayes' rule does not apply off the equilibrium path) and, if firm I is actually weak, it
is ex post optimal to go IN as well. We see that, in games of imperfect information,
the question of which threats (actions) are credible amounts to asking which beliefs are
credible, since actions can be made credible (i.e. ex post optimal in a BayPSian sense)
by adoptiug incredible belicfs.
Tlre problem of }row to define credible beliefs has drawn a lot of attention from
game theorists since it was first formulated in KREPS AND WILSON ( 1982). Various
formalizatious have been proposed and lack of space prevents a detailed discussion here
(see VAN DAMME ( 1987, Ch. 10)), but the main ideas may be sketched briefly (also
see CHO AND KREPS ( 1987)). The central theme is that of Forward Induction, i.e.
the question of when one observes something unexpected, then what should one deduce
from the past and what should one infer for the future? The simplest formulation of
this idea is due to David Kreps and is known as "the intuitive criterion". It amounts to
saying that one should not believe that one is dealing with a type that cannot benefit
at all by choosing the unexpected action. The criterion is quite weak, hence, frequently,
it is not very helpful. This is also the case in the game of Fig. 2(both the strong and
weak type of firm I benefit from choosing IN if this leads to II staying OUT), hence, we
will not discuss it further.
A rnuch more stronger ( and more controversial) concept requires that one belicves
one deals with those types that most easily gain from the defection. Formally, this
notion requires "independence of never weak best responses" (INWBR), it ia implied bya
the concept of stable equilibrium advanced in KOHLBERG AND MERTENS (1986).
Consider, in the game of Fig. 2, the pooling equilibrium where both types of I choose
OUT'. To prevent the strong type to deviate to IN, firm II should after IN go IN as well
with a probability p satisfying
-xptl-pG0
Similarly, to force the weak type to choose OUT, we should have
-ap f 1 - p c 0 (3.2)
If x C a only the first constraint is binding, hence, the strong type is more inclined to
deviate. In this case, INWBR requires that, after IN, firm II believes it is dealing with
the strong firm I, hence, it should stay OUT. But if II stays OUT, I moves IN. Hence,
if x C a only the pooling equilibrium where firm I gces IN and II stays OUT satisfies
INWBR. (It indeed satisfies this requirement; more generally, Kohlberg and Mertens
have shown that there always exists a stable equilibrium outcorne.)
H x~ a, condition (3.'l) is binding and according to [NWBR, the belief that one faces
the weak type if I unexpectedly chooses IN is credible. In fact, the pooling equilibrium
in which both types of I choose OUT is stable (in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens)
if x~ a. (It should be noted that also the `intuitive outcome' is stable and that there
exists a third equilibrium (in which the strong type randomizes the weak type chooses
IN, and II gces IN after IN with probability p- 1~(1-}-x)), that is stable as well.) There
exist rcfined equilibrium notions that exclude those equilibria where firm I dces not pool
at IN (sce OKIJNO-FUJIWARA AND POSTLEWAITE (1987) for example) but none
oí these is entirely satisfactory. All these concepts are based on the idea that, since it is
in the interest of the types of firm I to pool at IN they will do so, hence, these concepts
assume that different types of a player can cooperate to a certain extent (although they
are not physically present at the same point in time) and they assume away coordination9
problems. Hence, the state of the art is that current refined noncooperative equilibrium
concepts do not succeed in reducing the game of Fig. 2 to what (at first) seems the
unique plausible outcome. Apparently some work remains to be done. To conclude this
sectiou, let us however rernark that there exists an cntirely different theory (viz. that
of HARSANYI AND SELTEN (1988)) that dces not incorporate the idea of forward
induction, but that produces the `plausible' outcome in the game of Fig. 2. This theory
is based on uniform perturbations, i.e. on passive updating, hence, whenever something
unexpected happens one dces not deduce anything but rather one assumes that the
ex ante probabilities are still valid. Therefore, if E G a~(a -{- b), II will respond to an
unexpected IN with OUT and the 2 types of firm I can safely choose IN.
4 Advertising and Repetition
Let us return to the simple model of Section 2 but let us now assume that firms make
their entry decision simultaneously, i.e. firm II cannot condition its behavior on what I








The game of Fig. 3 has three Nash equilibria, viz. (IN, OUT), (OUT, IN) and an
equilibrium in which each firm randomizes, choosing IN with probability 1~(1 f a). The
latter equilibrium yields an expected payoff of zero for both firms.
Now let us introduce an asymmetry by assuming that, before making the entry de-
cision, firm I(and firtn 1 only) can start an advertising campaigu. h'or simplicity (but
without loss of generality) assume that the intensity of advertising is not a choice vari-
able, firm I just chooses whether or not to advertise. Finally, assume that advertising
costs c with 0 G c C 1 and that firm II can observe whether I advertises or not. The
question is whether firm I advertises and which firm will enter the market.10
Using Forward Induction, the reasoning of firm II runs as follows. Firm I can guarantee
itself a payoff of zero by not advertising and staying OUT. If firm I advertises, I(i.e.
firm 11) shoulcl conclude that it gc~s IN for atherwise it will simply have incurred an
unnec:~ssary loss of c. Hence, if firm I advertises, I(i.e. firm II) ahould stay OUT. Firm
I1, therefore, concludes that, by advertising, firm I guarantees itself a payoff oC 1- c~ 0.
Ilowever, then taking the argument one step further, firm II should conclude that firm
I will also go IN even if it does not advertise. Namely, staying OUT only yields zero so
that I would have foregone a sure payoff of 1- c. Hence, II concludes that I chooses IN
irrespective of whether it advertises or not, hence II stays OUT in both circumstances.
Firm I, mimicking the above reasoning, concludes that there is no need to advertise and
choose.s IN.
The ast.utc~ rf~ader will have noted that the above Forward Induction argument
amounts to nothing else thau elimination of weakly dominated strategies in the nor-
mal form o[ the game. Indeed there is a link between the 2 concepts (see KOHLBERG
AND MER1'ENS (1986) and VAN DAMME (1989)), Forward Induction generally is
more restrictive, however2.
The latter claim may be illustrated by considering the game in which, before mak-
ing the entry decision, the 2 firms simultaneously decide whether to advertise or not.
(Hence, also firm II now has the possibility to advertise, and w.l.o.g. we may assume
that its adve~rtising costs are also c..) Assinne that before making thc entry decision,
it is common knowledge which firms advertised. 'The normal form of this game is an
8 x 8 bimatrix game and by eliminating dominated strategies it cannot be reduced that
much. However, Forward Induction still allows to eliminate many equilibria and leads
to the conclusion that, in any `sensible' equilibrium both firms must advertise with pos-
itive probability. Namely, consider a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in which
no firm aclvertises. (The ones where only one firm advertises are disposed of just as
easily.) Therc are just three of these: After the first stage players continue with one
zln the literature one may find various definitiona that try to capture the intuition of Forward
[nduction, but none ia completely satisfactory (see VAN DAMME (1989)). In what followa, we will
indentiCy Forward Induction with the INWBR criterion described in Section 3.11
of the equilibria from the bimatrix of Fig. 3. Suppose they continue with (IN, OUT).
Then II's payoff in equilibrium is zero. By advertising in the first stage, firm II may
credibly signal that it will choose IN rather than OUT in the second stage (advertising
followed by OUT leads to a sure loss, followed by IN it may give a profit if 1- c), hence
firrn I has to give in. The other possibilities are eliminated by a similar argument. (If
players intended to randomize at stage 2, then each firm can credibly signal that only
it should be IN by advertising.) Hence, advertising must occur. It can be checked that
there e,xists exactly one symmetric equilibrium outcome that cannot be eliminated by
Forward Induction (i.e. that is stable): In the first stage, each firm advertises with
probability I- c, if it happens that only firm advertises then this firm captures the
market at stage 2, otherwise firms play the mixed equilibrium from Fig. 3 at stage 2.
The expected payoffs in this equilibrium are zero, hence, advertising is purely dissipative.
Let us return to the basic game from Fig. 3 without advertising. Assume that this
game is repeated twice, with firms having full information about the outcome at stage I
when they make their second entry decision. Also assume 0 G a G 1. The 2-stage game
has many subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of which some may be eliminated by
Forward Induction. Consider, for example, the outcome in which (IN, OUT) is played in
both periods. Firm II has a payofF zcro in this equilibrium, hence, if II deviates to IN iu
the first period (thereby incurring a cost a) it credibly signals that it will choose IN also
in the second period since this is the only way by means of which II can recoup the cost.
Firm I realizes this and indeed stays OUT in period 2, thereby enabling II to make and
overall profit of 1- a. (Formally, the outcome in which (IN, OUT') is played twice dces
not satisfy INWBR in the normal form of the 2-period game.) Similarly the outcome in
which only firm II is IN in both periods does not satisfy INWBR, nor does an outcome
in which first one firni is TN and then therc is randornization in the aecond pcriod. O(
the outcomes that consist of strings of one-shot pure equilibria, only two are consistent
with the Forward hiduction logic: The firms alternate in being in the market. Hence,
there seems a tendency to fair sharing. In addition to these sharing equilibria, there
also exist many inefficient equilibria in which both firms randomize in the first period.12
Such equilibria are also consistent with Forward Induction since deviations cannot be
detected, hence, there can be no signaling. For further results on Forward Induction
in repeated games the reader is referred to OSBORNE (1987) and PONSSARD (1989).
Let us mention that not much is known yet. For example, denote by P(n) the set of
average payoff vectors associated with stable equilibria of the n times repetition of the
game from Fig. 3. One would like to know lim„ P(n), but one does not know it. (Is it
the line segment from (0, 0) to (r~2,'~2)?)
5 Commitment and Entry Deterrence
In the basic game írom Fig. 1 there is a first mover advantage: Firm I gets the market.
The situation would be different if firm II could make credible the threat to go IN
irrespective of what I dces. If II could commit itself in advance, i.e. if II could make
the choice of OUT after the IN of player I infeasible or highly unattractive, then the
threat would be credible. Hence, when possible, it is attractive for II to commit itself in
advance. Of course, it is also necessary that I knows that II is committed. In turn it is
important that II attaches positive probability to I knowing that II is committed. The
commitment of II being common knowledge is definitely sufficient for commitment being
optimal. In this section we first make the above statements more precise. Thereafter,
we show that, in a repeated context, it is sufficient that I attaches an arbitrarily small,
but positive probability to II being committed. The latter part of the section is based
on KREPS AND WILSON (1982a).
I,et us first consider the situation where the commitment of II is common knowledge.
The game of Fig. 1 is modified such that first II chooses to commit (-C), i.e. to delete
his choices OUT in Fig. I, or not (-N) and that I is informed of II's choice. If II
chooses N, the game from Fig. 1 is played, if C is chosen they play the game in which
OUT is not available for II. It is easily seen that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
prescribes that II should commit and that I should stay OUT, hence, II captures the
market. The situation is different if I is not informed whether II has chosen C or N(and
ií II knows that I is not informed). Replacing subgames by their unique equilibria, this13
situation may be reduced to a simultaneous move game where I chooses between IN and








(OU'1', C) and (IN, N) are equilibria of this game, but only the latter survives elim-
ination of dominated strategies. Therefore, when II knows that I does not know whether
II is committed, it is optimal not to commit and I captures the market. Let us finally
in this static context analyze what happens when II does not. know what I knows: II
thinks that with probability p I is informed about his choice between C or N and that
with probability 1- p I is not informed. If I indeed is informed or uninformed and if p is
common knowledge, we have a well-defined game with incomplete information. If p 1 0,
there exists a(stable) equilibrium in which II commits and captures the market, and if
p~ a~(1 f a) this is the only equilibrium. Ií p G a~(1 ~- a), however, there also exists
an equilibrium where II does not commit and I gces IN, as well as an equilibrium where
both I and II randomize.
The above makes clear that, even in this simple context, the outcome crucially de-
pends on the players' knowledge. We will return to this issue in Section 6.
Next, let us turn to repetitions of the game of Fig. 1. Assume that there are N
markets in which firm II contemplates entering. Unfortunately, iri each market there is
a competitor (firm I„ in market n) who has the option to enter first. In each market the
garne from Fig. 1 is played. We assume the game starts in market N, then moves to
N- 1 etc., until market 1, and that, when playing Lhe game in market n, the players II
and I„ are fully informed about what happened in any market k with n G k G N. In
order to simplify the derivation below somewhat we will assume that I„ ~ Ik if n~ k
(i.e. different competitors in different markets) so that only II is a"long-runr player,
but qualitatively the analysis would also go through with two long run players. In the14
game just described, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium: Firm I„ enters
in market n(for any n) and II stays out everywhere. To some extent, this result is
counterintuitivc as one might have expected that II will invest to require a reputation
for toughness. Specifically, firms I„ with n large may fear that if they enter, II will choose
IN as well in order to convince firms Ik (k G n, k not too small) that they better stay
out; and as a consequence firms I„ (n large) would prefer to stay out. Hence, one might
have expected that II captures at least the initial markets. The fact that formal game
theoretic reasoning does not capture the intuition in this case is known as the chain store
paradox (SELTEN (1973)).
In the remainder of this section we show that the equilibrium may be completely
different (and may be more in accordance with the intuition) if the firms I just assign a
small, but positive probability to the event that II may be committed to IN. Specifically,
we assume that each firm I„ believes that there is a probability e that II is an automaton
that is programmed to play always IN in the game of Fig. 1. The heuristic argument for
why the outcome is di(fereut is that now reputation arguments can come into play. The
argume.nt runs as follows: Firm I„ should choose IN if the probability that II chooses IN
as well is sufficiently small, otherwise it should stay out. Clearly, the probability that II
chooses IN in market n is not zero: II may be committed. However, In should consider
the probability that II chooses IN to be larger than the probability that II is committed.
Namely, if player II would choose OUT after IN, II would reveal itself as not being the
automaton, hence II would receive zero for the rest of the game. (When it becomes
common knowledge that II is not committed, players continue with the subgame perfect
equilibrium described above.) However, if II chooses IN after OUT, the firms Ik with
k G n may revise upward their belíef that 11 is committed and they may conclude that it
is better to stay out. Elence, if n large, firm [„ realizes that II has such a strong desire to
pretend to be an automaton, that, therefore, the probability of fought entry is so large
that it is better to stay out. Consequently, II will indeed capture the initial markets.
The formal analysis proceeds by backwards induction. (See KREPS AND WILSON
(1982a) or VAN DAMME (1987, Ch. 10) for more details.) Since, in equilibrium, the
payoffs to player II cannot be negative (II can guarantee zero by consistently choosingis
OUT) it follows that II chooses IN when In chooses OUT. (If II would choose OUT
as well its payoff would be zero, by choosing IN the payoff is at least 1.) Hence, we
will concentrate on what happens when I„ chooses IN. Let pn be the probability that
I„ attaches to the event that II is an automaton, let e„ be the probability that the
noncommitted firm II chooses IN after the IN of firm I,,, and let f„ be the probability
I„ assigns to entry being fought, J;, - p„ -} (1 - p„)e~. Finally, let v„ be the overall
equilibrium payoff of the noncommitted firm II summed over the markets 1, ..., n if
beliefs in market n are p,,. (We will show that these payoffs are almost always unique.)
We assume 0 G a G I.
Since player I„ is "short run", his decision is easy: Choose IN if the resulting expected
payoíf is larger than zero, hence
IN ir fn G l~(I ~ a), oUT if In ~ II(I t a) (5.I)
Now consider market n - I. Obviously el - 0, hence, fr - p~. Therefore
1 if pl 1 I~(1 t a)
vr - E[0,1] if pl - I~(I ~- a)
0 if PI G I~(I -}-a)
Next, consider market n- 2, assume that pz ) I~(1 f a) and that I~ chooses IN. If
II responds with IN as well, Bayesian updating forces Il to put p~ - p2, hence, to stay
OUT. Consequently, IN yields II a payoff 1- a~ 0, so that IN is optimal. Next, assume
p2 G 1~(1 i- a) and I2 chooses IN. Bayesian updating now leads to the conclusion that,
if II responds with IN, its payoff is -2a G 0, hence, IN cannot be optimal. On the other
hand, in equilibrium, we cannot have that II chooses O[JT, since in this case, fought
entry would signal that II is committed, hence, it would lead to I1 staying OUT, but
then II would rather pretend to be committed. We see that, in equilibrium, II must
randomize if 12 chooses IN and p2 G 1(1 t a). Such randomization is optimal only if 1116
is indifferent, and given that revealing to be not committed yields zero, we see that we




Ps t (1 - ps)ez
so that
e2 - a~ if p~ G 1~(1 -~ a) (5.4)
1 - p~
and, thc~refore
fz - pz(1 d- a) if pZ G 1~(1 t a) (5.5)
Substituting the latter equality into (5.1) yields that Iz should stay OUT if p2 G
1~(1 f a)2, and v2 can now be computed. The induction can be continued, and one finds
that I" should stay OUT ifp" G I~(I~-a)". If N is largeenough, then pN - e G I~(lfa)N
and IN stays out. Then N- 1 does not havP new information, hence pN-r - pN and also
it stays out. We see that at least the initial competitors stay out. In particular, for fixed
e~ 0, as N-a oo almost all competitors stay out: A little bit of uncertainty may make
a lot of difference. (For more general results on long run players that are committed
with small probability, see FUDENBERG AND LEVINE (1989).)
One may also imagine the situation in which the firms I" know that II is not committed
but iu wliich they do not exactly know the profit function of II: Yerhaps the market is
even profitable as a duopoly [or firm II. Call firm II strong in the latter case and weak ií
payoffs are as in Fig. 1. Assume firms I" assign ex ante probability E to II being strong.
Intuitively this situation is very much like the one analyzed above: The strong type offirm II will always go IN and the weak type will pretend to be strong, at least initially.
Hence, one expects the same outcome. This intuition is indeed confirmed by formal
game theoretic analysis, but, what is perhaps a bit surprising at first, is that one needs
a refinement of sequential equilibrium (i.e. a Forward Induction argument, or (formally)
INWBR) to obtain this conclusion. If one does not use Forward Induction, one cannot
eliminate counterintuitive equilibria in which I„ gces IN and II stays OUT irrespective
of its type. For example, if pz is large enough (but pz C I) it is possible that h gces IN
and that II stays OUT of market 2. The reason that II does not go in is that Il would
(foolishly) interpret such fought entry as a signal that II is weak. INWBR forces I1 to
draw the proper conclusion that II is strong in such case, hence, it affords the strong type
a profitable deviation, and eliminates such equilibria. (An interesting open question is
to what extent the results of FUDENBERG AND LEVINE (1989) can be extended to
games where the short run players are uncertain about the motives (payoffs) of the long
run player.)
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to make two related points:
(~) In many games that arise naturally there exists a multiplicity of equilibria. To come
u}i with definite predictions, game theorists have had to refine their equilibrium
concepts. In interesting classes of games, the multiplicity is caused by the existence
of what, under closer examination, turn out to be incredible threats, either in
actions or in beliefs. Several concepts that aim to exclude equilibria sustained by
such incredible threats were illustrated and examples were given where even the
most refined concepts do not give `what we want', implying that either intuition is
wrong or that the theory is incomplete.
(ii) Seemingly minor changes in the rules of the game may have drastic consequences
on the outcome. We have played around with several variations of the basic market
entry game from Section 2 and along the way we have encountered many different
solutions. Hence, game theoretic predictions do not seem very robust. Closer18
examination, however, may reveal that the variations in the game were not minor
ones at all, and that game theoretic analysis has given us the insight why such
cbanges are essentiaL (Up to now, we do not yet have a satisíactory topology on
games.) What should have become clear, however, is that modeling the knowledge
of players is a delicate issue. This should be a point of concern for game theorists,
especially since any game theoretic analysis assumes that the game itself is common
knowledge. (For a nice illustration of the importance of common knowledge see
Ri1BINSTEIN (1989).)
The issues raised above actually cast some doubt on the relevance of the refinements
program. Namely, Forward Induction requires that one looks for consistent explanations
of observed deviations within the given game. Since the model is narrowly defined it
may indeed be possible to come up with a unique `sensible' explanation of why a player
deviated. If, however, one would allow for richer models3 one probably would find many
more consistent explanations, hence, Forward Induction may loose its power. One could
actually have some kind of Uncertainty Principle: Within a given model, there exists a
unique `plausible' outcome, but over the class of plausible models, this outcome varies
considerably. By tracing the class of `plausible' models, one may trace out the set of all
Nash equilibria of the original game; if one dces not (or cannot) fix the game, refinement
is futile. (A related point is made in FUDENBERG, KREPS AND LEVINE (1988), in
my view, however, their topology on games is too coarse.)
References
Binmore, K. (1987). Modelling Rational Ylayers, Part 1. Economics and
Philosophy 3, 179-214.
Cho, L-K. and D. Kreps (1987). Signalling Cames and Stable Equilibria.
Quarlerly Juurnal of Ecunomics 102, 179-221.
Damme, E. van ( 1987). Stability and Perfection of Nash Equiliória Berlin:
Springer-Verlag.
3The critique oC E3INMORF, (1987) (see Fn. 1) also looses ita force if one allowe richer models.19
Fudenberg, D. and D.K. Levine (1989). R.eputation and Equilibrium Selec-
tion in Games with a Patient Player. Econometrica 57, 759-778.
Fudenberg, D., D. Kreps and D.K. Levine (1988). On the Robustness of
Equilibrium Refinements. Journal oj Economic Theory 44, 354-380.
Harsanyi, J. and R. Selten (1988). A Ceneml Theory ojEquilibrium Selection
in Cames. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Kreps, D.M. and R. Wilson (1982a). Sequential Equilibria. Econometrica
50, 863-894.
Kreps, D.M. and R. Wilson (19826). Reputation and Imperfect Information.
Journal oj Economic Theory 27, 253-279.
Okuno-Fujiwara, M. and A. Postlewaite (1987). Forward Induction and
Equilibrium Refinement. CARESS Working Paper ~87-01, University
of Pennsylvania.
Osborne, M.J. (1987). Signaling, Forward Induction, and Stability in Finitely
Repeated Games. Discussion Paper, McMaster University.
Ponssard, J.-P. (1989). Forward Induction and Sunk Costs give Average Cost
Pricing. Discussion Paper, École Polytechnique.
Rubinstein, A. (1989). The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under
"Almost Common Knowledgen. American Economic Revíew79, 385-391.
Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit
Nachfragetrágheit. Zeitschrift jur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 12, 301-
324.
Selten, R. (1975). Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium
Points in Extensive Games. lnternationalJournal oj Game Theory 4, 25-
55.
Selten, R. (1978). The Chain Store Paradox. Theory and Decision 9, 127-
159.
Spence, A.M. (1974). Market Sígnalling: Injormation Transferin Hiring and
Re.lated Processes. Harvard University Press.Discussion Paper Series, CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands:
No. Author(s)
8801 Th. ven de Klundert
end F. van der Plceg
Title
Fiscal Policy and Finite Lives in Interde-
pendent Economies with Real and Nominal Wage
Rigidity
8802 J.R. Magnus and
B. Pesaran
8803 A.A. Weber
8804 F. van der Ploeg and
A.J. de Zeeuw
8805 M.F.J. Steel
8806 Th. Ten Raa end
E.N. Wolff
8807 F. van der Ploeg
8901 Th. Ten Raa end
P. Kop Jansen
8902 Th. Nijman and F. Palm
8903 A. van Soest,
I. Woittiez, A. Kapteyn
8904 F. van der Ploeg
8905 Th. van de Klundert and
A. van Schaik
8906 A.J. Markink and
F. van der Ploeg
8907 J. Osiewalski
8908 M.F.J. Steel
The Bias of Forecasts from a First-order
Autoregression
The Credibility of Monetary Policies, Policy-
makers' Reputation and the EMS-Hypothesis:
Empirical Evidence from 13 Countriea
Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Competitive
Arms Accumulation
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equation
Systems under Diffuse Stochastic Prior
Information: A Recursive Analytical Approach
Secondary Products and the Measurement of
Productivity Growth
Monetary and Fiscal Policy in Interdependent
Economies with Capital Accumulation, Death
and Population Growth
The Choice of Model in the Construction of
Input-Output Coefficients Matrices
Generalized Least Squares Estimation of
Linear Models Containing Rational Future
Expectations
Labour Supply, Income Taxes and Hours
Restrictions in The Netherlands
Capital Accumulation, Inflation and Long-
Run Conflict in International Objectives
Unemployment Persistence and Loss of
Productive Capacity: A Keynesian Approach
Dynamic Policy Simulation of Linear Models
with Rational Expectations of Future Events:
A Computer Package
Posterior Densities for Nonlinear Regression
with Equicorrelated Errors
A Bayesian Analysis of Simultaneous Equation
Modela by Combining Recursive Analytical and
Numerical ApproachesNo. Author(s)
8909 F. van der Ploeg
891o R. Gradus and
A. de Zeeuw
8911 A.P. Barten
8912 K. Kamiya and
A.J.J. Talman
8913 G. van der Lean and
A.J.J. Talman
8914 J. Osiewalski and
M.F.J. Steel
8915 R.P. Gilles, P.H. Ruys
and J. Shou
Title
Two Essays on Political Economy
(i) The Political Economy of Overvaluation
(ii) Election Outcomes and the Stockmarket
Corporate Tax Rate Policy and Public
and Private Employment
Allais Characterisation of Preference
Structures and the Structure of Demand
Simplicial Algorithm to Find Zero Points
of a Function with 5pecial Structure on a
Simplotope
Price Rigidities and Rationing
A Bayesian Analysis of Exogeneity in Models
Pooling Time-Series and Cross-Section Data
On the Existence of Networks in Relational
Models
8916 A. Kapteyn, P. Kooreman Quantity Rationing and Concavity in a
and A. van Soest Flexible Household Labor Supply Model
891~ F. Canova
8918 F. van der Ploeg
8919 W. Bossert and
F. Stehling
8920 F. van der Ploeg
8921 D. Canning
8922 C. Fershtman and
A. Fishman
8923 M.B. Canzoneri and
C.A. Rogers
8924 F. Groot, C. Withagen
and A. de Zeeuw
Seasonalities in Foreign Exchange Markets
Monetary Disinflation, Fiscal Expansion and
the Current Account in an Interdependent
World
On the Uniqueness of Cardinally Interpreted
Utility Functions
Monetary Interdependence under Alternative
Exchange-Rate Regimes
Bottlenecks and Persistent Unemployment:
Why Do Booms End?
Price Cycles and Booms: Dynamic Search
Equilibrium
Is the European Community an Optimal Currency
Area? Optimal Tax Smoothing versus the Cost
of Multiple Currencies
Theory of Natural Exhaustible Resources:
The Cartel-Versus-Fringe Model ReconsideredNo. Author(s)
8925 O.P. Attanasio and
G. Weber
8926 N. Rankin
8927 Th. van de Klundert
8928 c. Dang
8929 M.F.J. Steel and
J.F. Richard
8930 F. van der Ploeg
8931 H.A. Keuzenkamp
8932 E. van Damme, R. Selten
and E. Winter
8933 H. Carlsson and
E. van Damme
8934 H. Huizinga
8935 C. Dang ana
D. Talman




8939 W- Guth ana
E. van Damme




Consumption, Productivity Growth and the
Interest Rate
Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a'Hartian'
Model of Imperfect Competition
Reducing External Debt in a World with
Imperfect Asset and Imperfect Commodity
Substitution
The D1 -Triangulation of Rn for Simplicial
Algorithms for Computing Solutions of
ivuniinear cquacions
Bayesian Multivariate Exogeneity Analysis:
An Application to a UK Money Demand Equation
Fiscal Aspects of Monetary Integration in
Europe
The Prehistory of Rational Expectations
Alternating Bid Bargaining with a Smallest
Money Unit
Global Payoff Uncertainty and Risk Dominance
National Tax Policies towards Product-
Innovating Multinational Enterprises
A New Triangulation of the Unit Simplex for
Computing Economic Equilibria
The Nonresponse Bias in the Analysis of the
Determinants of Total Annual Expenditures
of Households Based on Panel Data
The Estimation oF Mixed Demand Systems
Monetary Shocks and the Nominal Interest Rate
Equilibrium Selection in the Spence Signaling
Game
Monopolistic Competition, Expected Inflatáon
and Contract Length
The Generalized Extreme Value Random Utility





8946 W.B. MacLeod and
J.M. Malcomson
8947 A. van Soest and
A. Kapteyn




Weak Exogenity in Misspecified Sequential
Models
Dual Capacity Trading and the Quality of the
Market
Identification and Estimation of Dichotomous
Latent Variables Models Using Panel Data
Equilibrium in a Pure Exchange Economy with
an Arbitrary Communication Structure
Efficient Specific Investments, Incomalete
Contracts, and the Role of Market Alterna-
tives
The Impact of Minimum Wage Regulations on
Employment and the Wage Rate Distribution
Maximum Score Estimation in the Ordered
Response Model
The D -Triangulation for Simplicial
Defo~ation Algorithms for Computing
Solutions of Nonlinear Equations
Dealer Behaviour and Price Volatility in
Asset Markets
895i T. Wansbeek and Simple Estimators for Dynamic Panel Data
A. Kapteyn Models with Errors in Variables
8952 Y. Dai, G. van der Laan, A Simplicial Algorithm for the Nonlinear
D. Talman and Stationary Point Problem on an Unbounded
Y. Yamamoto Polyhedron
8953 F. van der Ploeg Risk Aversion, Intertemporal Substitution and
Consumption: The CARA-LQ Problem
8954 A. Kapteyn,
S. van de Geer,





8957 E. van Damme
Interdependent Preferences: An Econometric
Analysis
Ownership Structure and Efficiency: An
Incentive Mechanism Approach
On the Empirical Implementation of Some Game
Theoretic Models of Household Labor Supply
Signaling and Forward Induction in a Market
Entry ContextPp RnY an1~~ ~nnn i F TII Ri IRr TNF ~IFTNFRI.ANDS
Bibliotheek K. U. Brabant
II~IIMIIIIMIMIMIINIIINI~IIIII